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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an analysis of the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry
based on and related to the current antitrust case involving its leading producers.
A spatial competition framework is employed, with brands assumed relatively immo-
bile. It is argued that the industry's conduct, in which price compeititon is
avoided and rivalry focuses on new brand introductions, tends to deter entry and
protect profits. Entry into a new segment of the market in the 1970's is dis-
cussed. Relevant welfare-theoretic issues are analyzed, and it is argues that
the remedy proposed by the FTC is likely to improve performance.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In April, 1972, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint charging
violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act against the four lar-
gest U.S. manufacturers of ready-to-eat breakfast cereal (hereinafter simply RTE
cereal): Kellogg, General Mills, General Foods, and Quaker Oats. In a section
headed "Brand Proliferation, Product Differentiation and Trademark Promotion,"
the complaint discussed the brand introduction and sales promotion activities of
these firms and charged that "These practices of proliferating brands, differen-
tiating similar products and promoting trademarks through intensive advertising
result in high barriers to entry into the RTE cereal market." The complaint did
not describe the mechanism through which such conduct was alleged to impede entry.
The trial stemming from this complaint began in April, 1976. As this is writ-
ten (fall, 1977), that trial seems far from over.
This essay presents the analysis of entry conditions in the RTE cereal market
upon which the author's testimony as a government witness in that trial was based.
It takes as given certain factual points that complaint counsel have sought to
establish (on the basis of evidence generally restricted to the pre-complaint
period). There is little point in debating controversial issues of fact outside
the courtroom until the record in this case is complete. Still, an indication of
the economics of the government's position in this potentially important antitrust
action may be of interest. Further, the analysis that follows develops and applies
a number of ideas that have appeared in the theoretical literature, and it may have
implications for the study of other industries.
Some key factual points are stated below. Section II then presents-and dis-
cusses three important features of the RTE cereal industry that serve as assump-
tions in the analysis that follows. In Section III, these assumptions are applied
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to static analysis of entry deterrence, under the assumption commonly made in
theoretical work that established sellers can arrange their affairs once and for
all in anticipation of possible entry. Section IV relaxes this assumption and
considers the dynamics of seller conduct and entry deterrence in the RTE cereal
industry. Some welfare-theoretic implications of the analysis are discussed in
Section V, and the likely impact of the government's relief proposals is evaluated
in their light in Section VI.
The production of RTE cereal has been highly concentrated throughout the post-
was period, with the four respondent firms generally accounting for at least 85%
of sales and the top six firms generally capturing at least 95% of the market.
Sales of RTE cereal grew rapidly and fairly steadily from 1950 until the mid 1960's.
Relatively slow growth was experienced in the latter part of that decade, though
rapid growth seems to have returned in the early 1970's. From 1940 until the early
1970's, no new producers of RTE cereal attained non-negligible market shares. In
the early 1970's, however, several large firms entered the industry and began na-
tional marketing of so-called natural cereals.
It appears that the leading sellers generally received very high profits from
their RTE cereal operations, even after due allowance is made for biases in account-
ing measures of rates of return. Since observed variability in sales and profits
of leading firms does not seem unusually great, and accounting rates of return re-
mained high during the late 1960's, these profits do not seem explicable as compen-
sation for risk bearing.
Given the industry's growth and profitability, the lack of noticeable entry by
new firms over a long period implies the existence of some impediment or barrier to
entry. Any explanation of the lack of entry of substantial new firms must be con-
sistent with the frequent introduction of new brands by established sellers.
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Between 1950 and 1972, the six leading producers introduced over 80 brands into
distribution beyond test market. The total number of brands in distribution beyond
test market rose from about 25 at the start of 1950 to about 80 at the end of 1972.
Further, any explanation of the lack of significant new firm entry during the 1950-
1970 period must also be consistent with the subsequent entry of new firms in the
natural cereal area in the early 1970's, relatively soon after a slackening in
overall demand growth.
In order to see the analytical problem more clearly, it will be useful to con-
sider industry attributes generally thought to be relevant to conditions of entry.5
The best available evidence suggests that the minimum efficient firm size in this
market, as of the mid-1960's, involved a 3-5% market share. Scale economies of
this magnitude would not seem sufficient to explain the prolonged persistence of
very high profits, nor is any explanation based on them easily reconciled with the
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entry of the 1970's. Neither patents nor ownership of raw materials sources are
important in this industry. Brand-specific production knowhow is apparently pre-
sent, since established firms are sometimes unable to duplicate each others' brands.
But this has not prevented any of them from producing, promoting, and distributing
successful new brands. The products in this market are clearly differentiated, and
advertising-sales ratios have generally exceeded 10% in the post-war period. But
it is again hard to reconcile an important barrier based on advertising or differen-
tiation per se with the new brand and new firm entry that did occur. (It should
also be noted that company name has not always received great stress in the esta-
blished firms' advertising.)
Finally, the absolute capital costs (including product development and intro-
ductory advertising) of efficient entry have been estimated to be in the $80-150
million range in the early 1970's. Neither this cost nor any of the other factors
mentioned in the preceeding paragraph would seem sufficient to explain the lack of
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entry into this market during the 1950-1970 period by large, diversified food
processing firms, some of which (Pet and Colgate, for instance) entered in the
early 1970's. In any case, this conclusion will be assumed to be correct in what
follows. (It is, of course, not accepted by the four respondent firms in the cur-
rent FTC proceeding.)
II. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
This section describes a conceptual framework suitable for analysis of the RTE
cereal market and, it would seem, at least some other markets in which product se-
lection is an important element of conduct. The three component assumptions of that
framework are (1) increasing returns at the brand level, (2) localized rivalry
among brands, and (3) relative immobility in product space at the brand level.
These will be described and discussed in turn.
Increasing returns It will be assumed that for individual brands, at least at
low levels of output, the unit cost of production and marketing falls with increases
in output. As writers from Chamberlin [1959] to Spence [1976a] have observed, a
range of increasing returns in the production and marketing of individual brands
of differentiated products is both technologically plausible and necessary to ac-
count for the observed structures of such markets, Without such a range of increas-
ing returns, for instance, each consumer in the country would be able to purchase
(or, for that matter, to manufacture) at reasonable cost one or more brands of RTE
cereal tailored exactly to his or her tastes. In fact, as of the late 1960's,
individual brands of RTE cereal tended to be considered viable only if they captured
around 1% of the market.
A common simplifying assumption in this context, both in studies concerned
with differentiation by location (e.g., Eaton and Lipsey [1976a]) and in those fo-
cusing on product differentiation more generally (e.g., Spence [1976a]), is that
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the long-run total cost of producing and marketing a typical brand is given by
(1) C(q) = F + vq,
where F and v are positive constants, and q is the output of the brand. This cost
function will be employed for illustrative purposes below; it is merely the simplest
functional form that exhibits increasing returns.
The appropriate interpretation of "long-run total cost" or of equation (1) in
the RTE cereal context requires comment. There are presumably increasing returns
in the production of RTE cereal brands, at least at low levels of output. Market-
ing costs are substantial in this industry, and it would. appear that there are also
increasing returns in marketing over a brand's life cycle. As the RTE cereal market
has operated in recent decades, new brand launchings have required substantial ini-
tial outlays for advertising (and, possibly, for research and development as well).
It is often asserted that introductory promotional activity can "buy" trials, but
that only satisfaction with a produce can generate repeat sales, Buyer satisfac-
tion clearly cannot be precisely predicted: if it could be, no new brands would
ever fail. It follows that costs of introductory advertising for any single brand
are at least to some extent independent of its subsequent sales. Even after a
brand has been launched, some advertising spending must have the intended effect of
"buying" first purchases, especially from new RTE cereal buyers and those consumers
whose personal life-cycle status has changed. If, for purposes of long-run analy-
sis, the brand life cycle is collapsed to a single point in time, introductory
advertising costs and some fraction of later advertising outlays may be treated to
a first approximation as corresponding to some of the fixed cost, F, in equation (1).
It is very important to keep-in mind, however, that the level of spending
required to launch a new RTE cereal or to produce any given number of initial trials
after launch is not independent of the level of advertising for other brands nor,
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in general, of the whole pattern of conduct in the industry. The more intensively
brand A is advertised, the harder it must be, ceteris paribus, to persuade consu-
mers to try a similar brand B. In terms of our illustrative equation (1), the
level of F is determined both by technology and by seller conduct in the industry.
We return to this point below.
Localized Rivalry Since Hotelling's [1929] classic study, models of spatial
competition have frequently been applied to study situations in which, as Lovell
[1970, p. 121] puts it, "variations in consumer taste give rise to product differ-
entiation." While consumers do not have perfect information about RTE cereals,
imperfect information does not seem to be the major reason why products are not
perceived as identical. In fact, individual RTE brands do differ physically in
perceptible ways, and the spectrum of available brands seems clearly to reflect
attempts to appeal to individuals with diverse tastes.
In Hotelling's [1929] model, a large number of small buyers are assumed to be
distributed uniformly along a finite line segment. Hotelling suggests that one can
imagine distance along that segment as indicating the sweetness of cider, so that
an individual buyer's location corresponds to the exact degree of sweetness he
likes best. In the Hotelling model, if all prices are equal, each consumer buys
one unit of the brand of cider that is most like his preferred type by patronizing
the brand closest to his location on the line. If there are several active sellers
on the line, and if individual buyers take into account both prices of and dis-
tances to these sellers in determining how much to purchase and which seller to
patronize (as most subsequent authors have assumed), then small changes in any
brand's price are only felt by its two closest neighbors on the line. 8 That is,
each individual brand of cider competes only with the closest brand on the right
(the sourest of the sweeter brands, say) and the closest brand on the left (the
sweetest of the sourer brands, say). In this framework, competitive effects are
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localized. Even though there may be many brands on the market, each brand is
effectively an oligopolist, since small price or location changes will have notice-
able impacts on only a small number of rival brands.
In contrast, in the symmetric model usually associated with Chamberlin [1962],
the effects of any single brandts competitive actions are assumed to have roughly
equal impact on each and every other brand on the market. In an important early
discussion of Chamberlin's [1962] work, Kaldor [1935] strongly criticized the sym-
metric model, arguing that the spatial view generally corresponded more closely to
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reality. Papers by Lerner and Singer [1937], Copeland [1940], and Smithies [1941]
analyzed and extended Hotelling's [1929] original spatial model; all argued its
general applicability to markets with differentiated products. By the early 1950's,
Chamberlin [1951, 1953] had explicitly accepted the spatial model as a useful tool,
and he seems to have recognized clearly that it implies localized rivalry and thus
makes oligopolistic interaction the norm (c.f. Chamberlin [1951, p. 68]).
In recent years, a large number of authors have studied spatial models and
have indicated that they cast light on differentiated markets in general. Tullock
[1965], Telser [1969,1971], Lovell [1970], Peles [1974], Hay [1976], Eaton and
Lipsey 1976b, 1976c] and Prescott and Visscher [1977] have assumed buyers to be
distributed along a line, a la Hotelling [1929].10 Stern [1972], and Eaton and
Lipsey [1975] have considered both that assumption and situations in which buyers
are distributed over a plane.- Samuelson [1967], Willig [1973], and Salop [1976]
have followed Chamberlin [1953] and analyzed models in which buyers are distributed
uniformly around a circle. 1
An attractive, but not yet well-developed alternative to the spatial model is
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Lancaster's [1966, 1971] "characteristics" approach to demand analysis. That
approach assumes that various products or brands are valued by consumers entirely
because they provide certain attributes or characteristics, so that demand for
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products is really derived from the underlying demand for characteristics. Brands
differ in the amounts of the various characteristics they supply.
As the analyses of Baumol [1967], Lancaster [1975], and Salop [1976b] have
shown, the formal correspondence between Lancastrian models with two characteristics
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and one-dimensional spatial models is almost exact.3 In particular, the same
localization of competitive effects is preserved; small changes in the price or
attributes of a single brand generally effect two and only two rival brands.
Archibald and Rosenblith [1975] have further shown that this sort of localiza-
tion is preserved in models with three characteristics. But in Lancastrian models
with four or more characteristics, the theoretical possibility emerges that the
average brand might have a large number of direct competitors; general theoretical
conditions that either guarantee or rule out this possibility are apparently not
yet known.
It seems likely that RTE cereals provide at least four different attributes
relevant to consumers. Existing brands differ in such potentially relevant dimen-
sions as sweetness, protein content, shape, grain base, vitamin content, fiber con-
tent, and crunchiness, for instance. The results of Archibald and Rosenbluth [1975]
would then seem to imply that the reasonability of the localization assumption in
this market is an empirical question. (As it must be in most differentiated mar-
kets.) The weight of the evidence seems to me to support it. (This is a judgement
with which respondents in the FTC action do not seem to agree.) A good deal of
marketing analysis in the industry is done in terms of segments, which are treated
as clusters of more directly competitive brands. Further, analysis often proceeds
in explicitly spatial terms, with discussions of clusters of brands, open spaces,
and of close and distant competitors. Marketing plans for individual brands tend
to place greatest stress on the actions of only a few rivals.
1l
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In what follows, it will be assumed that rivalry among brands is localized.
That is, it will be assumed that actions relating to any single brand will gener-
ally have important effects on only a small number of other brands. Because models
of spatial competition have been intensively studied and often applied to situations
of this sort, it will be convenient to use the spatial framework to indicate the
implications of localization. Thus, individual brands can be thought of as having
locations in economic or product space that correspond to the collections of attri-
butes that consumers perceive them to possess. Consumers' locations in this same
space then correspond to their most preferred (potential) brands. The simplest
specific structure of this sort arises when buyers can be thought of as uniformly
distributed around a circle. If there are at least two established brands, any new
brand must be positioned between two such brands. In the circular model, localiza-
tion is present in an extreme (and thus tractable) form: normally only the two
brands between which an entrant locates would be affected by changes in, for in-
stance its price.1 4
Relative Immobility If the relevant economic space is in fact geographic
space, so that brands differ only in the locations at which they are available, it
is clear that changes in location are rarely costless. New quarters must be lo-
cated, equipment must be packed, moved, and unpacked, and customers must be informed
of the move. Similarly, it is not generally costless to change brands' locations
in the space of consumer perceptions of attributes provided. There may be costs
associated with redesigning the product and retooling to produce a slightly dif-
ferent commodity. Even if a brand's location in product space-can be altered by
changing buyer perceptions without varying the physical characteristics of the good,
such changes must require special advertising effort. (At the very least, a new
campaign must be designed and prepared.) The existence of such "repositioning
costs" is well recognized in the marketing literature; see, for instance, Kotler
[1976, pp. 168-9].1 5
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In his pioneering analysis of the spatial model, Hotelling [1929] was somewhat
vague about brand mobility. The early studies of Lerner and Singer [1937] and
Smithies 1941] allowed all brands on the market costlessly to vary locations simul-
taneously. They sought, under various behavioral assumptions, equilibria in which
no further adjustments were profitable. It is surely rather difficult to imagine
markets, with geographic or other differentiation, to which such models might apply.
Moreover, such models have rather serious internal difficulties: see, e.g., Eaton
and Lipsey [1975] and Shaked [1975]. A second path of development, followed if
not begun by Copeland [1940], makes the other extreme assumption that brands' loca-
tions, once chosen, are irrevocably fixed. This assumption has been explicitly
made in discussions of brand entry by Tullock [1965], Peles [1974], Eaton and
Lipsey [1976b], Hay [1976], Rthschild, [1976], Salop [1976] and Prescott and
Visscher [1977]; it is clearly implicit in the discussions of Baumol [1967] and
Archibald and Lipsey [1975]. Tullock [1965] and Eaton and Lipsey [1976c] discuss
the consequences of relaxing this extreme assumption to permit movement with finite
costs.
I have seen nothing that suggests that RTE cereal producers have the excep-
tional ability to shift brands' locations in economic space without substantial
cost. In fact, established brand names are often dropped entirely when sales fall
to low levels, while at the same time new brands are being introduced. If the cost
of moving an old brand to an arbitrary location were less than the cost of intro-
ducing a new one, this would not be observed. The history of the industry contains
a number of instances of successful and unsuccessful attempts to reposition brands;
these generally involved substantial costs.
For simplicity, it will generally be assumed in what follows that brands' lo-
cations cannot be changed. But it should be clear in context that replacing this
with the assumption of substantial (but finite) repositioning costs would not affect
the qualitative nature of our conclusions.
III. STATIC THEORY OF ENTRY DETERRENCE
I first want to argue that the assumptions made above imply the existence of
situations in which established brands earn excess profit, but no potential entrant
(or established firm) finds it attractive to launch a new brand. Familiar diffi-
culties are encountered in attempts to prove this point mathematically. Under lo-
calization, the appearance of a new brand would have noticeable effects on only a
small number of established brands. A potential entrant's expectations about the
reactions of these few rivals must be central to his assessment of the attractive-
ness of entry. But it is generally recognized that there exist no simple, generally
plausible models of the formation of expectations about rivals' reactions in such
oligopoly situations.
On the other hand, numerous analyses that consider particular spatial struc-
tures and make more or less plausible assumptions about entrants' expectations have
found that entry may not suffice to eliminate excess profit. Copeland [1940,
pp 8-9] provides an early example. More formal descriptions of profitable situa-
tions immune to entry may be found in studies of spatial competition by Vickrey.
[1963], Beckman [1968], Lovell [1970], Peles [1974], Eaton [1976], Eaton and Lipsey
[1976a, 1976b, 1976c], Hay [1976], Salop [1976], and Prescott and Visscher [1977].
The main feature of all these analyses can be illustrated by a simple example that
also serves to introduce some useful apparatus,
Consider a situation in which buyers are uniformly distributed around a circle
of unit circumference. Let there be N established brands, located distances (1/N)
apart around the circle, all charging the same price, p. For simplicity, suppose
that all potential entrants face expected demand curves with sharp kinks at this
price. That is, they feel that established -rivals would not match prices above p,
and no such price would be superior to p. On the other hand, they expect prices
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below p to be rendered unattractive by drastic retaliatory price cuts by established
brands. Any new entrant would thus charge p. Let costs be given by equation (1),
and suppose that brands' locations cannot be changed. -As is usual in such models,
when all brands charge the same price, each buyer is assumed to patronize the clos-
est brand.
Let the demand for any particular brand by those who patronize it and who are
located at distances between x and (x+dx) from it along the circle be given by
a(p)(l-0ox)dx, where a(,) is decreasing, with 0 < a < 2.17 The larger is a, the more
sensitive total market demand is to the variety of brands offered. When brands dif-
fer only in geographic location, it is natural to write demand as a decreasing func-
tion of delivered price, say (p+cx) with c some constant. But unless differentia-
tion is explicitly and entirely geographical, this standard assumption has no com-
18pelling justification. It is defended entirely by analogy. The multiplicative
separability assumption introduced here has the convenient property that in symme-
tric situations, the elasticity of total demand with respect to price (number of
brands) is unaffected by the number of brands (level of price). While the cross-
effects thus assumed away may be important in some cases, it is not obvious which
way they run. It is far from obvious that the assumptions about these effects
implicit in the use of the delivered price model are sensible in other contexts.
If a particular brand is patronized by buyers located as far as d away on its
"right" and on its "left," its total demand is given by
d
(2) 2 f a(p)(l-ax)dx = a(p)(2d-ad2).
0
With N evenly-spaced established brands, each brand is closest for buyers located
up to half the distance to its rivals on either side. Since these are each (1/N)
away, d - 1/2N in this case. The demand for a typical brand in a market with N
evenly-spaced brands all charging price p is thus obtained from (2) as
.
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(3) q(p,N) a(p)(4N-a)/4N2 .
Let A(p) = (p-v)a(p), with p assumed greater than v. Then if costs are given by
(1), the profits of a typical established brand are
(4). r(p,N) = A(p)(4N-.)/4N2 - F.
Suppose that A(p) > 4F/(4-a), so that a single isolated brand would be profitable,
and neglect the requirement that N be integer. Fix p and let N be the value ob-
tained by setting (p,N) = 0 and solving. All established brands are then profit-
able as long as N < N.
An entrant must locate next to an established brand or somewhere between two
established brands. It is easy to show that on the assumptions above, the entrant
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always does best by locating exactly in the middle of any open interval. Such an
entrant's sales will be made only a distance 1/4N to the left and 1/4N to the right
-- halfway to the nearest rival brands, the locations of which he must rationally
assume fixed. Total demand for the new brand will be q(p,2N), repeating the develop-
ment leading to equation (3). It then follows that the entrant's profits will be
positive only if N is less than N/2. Hence, as long as N/2 < N < N, all existing
brands earn positive profits, but any entrant would suffer losses.
The detailed features of this example obviously depend on some rather strong
simplifying assumptions, but the general principles it illustrates do not, as dis-
cussions in the papers cited above and by Kaldor [1935] and Tullock [1965] make
clear. It has been familiar since at least Bain [1956] that a range of increasing
returns can by itself lead to profitable equilibria immune to entry. The assump-
tions of localized rivalry and relative immobility serve to magnify the effect of
this nonconvexity, as Eaton and Lipsey [1976b] note. Under localization, entry
imposes a noticeable increase in crowding in the relevant portion of economic space,
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regardless of conditions elsewhere. (In one-dimensional models, two-firm situations
become three-firm situations.) Under restricted mobility, an entrant cannot expect
existing brands to make room for him by changing their locations, so that the ini-
tial crowding he must create must be expected to persist.
In the example above, for instance, it can be shown that the post-entry profits
of the N established brands are maximized after entry (with price still fixed) by
moving to a configuration in which all N+l brands are evenly distributed around the
circle. If mobility were not restricted, a potential entrant might come to expect
that such repositioning would follow the appearance of his new brand. But he would
then expect profit given by (p,N+l), and deterrence would be effective only for
(N-l) < N < N. That is, if 80 brands would yield zero profit, entry would be
induced with fewer than 79 brands. With relocations (correctly or incorrectly)
perceived as impossible by potential entrants, however, entry does not become at-
tractive until N falls below 40. The possibilities for excess profits are obviously
greatly enhanced in the latter case.
I now want to go one step further and to suppose that established sellers col-
lude in order to deter entry at minimum cost to themselves. Two situations will be
compared: the unconstrained monopoly equilibrium, and the result of maximizing
total profit subject to the constraint that entry by brands with equivalent costs
be deterred. I will argue that optimal deterrence under our three basic assump-
tions is likely to be obtained mainly by increasing the number of brands, rather
than by any sort of limit pricing policy. In addition, established firms may find
it to their advantage to increase promotional outlays in the face of threatened
entry.
Let us begin with a simple illustrative formal model, which is a generalization
of the circular structure considered above. Let the cost function (1) apply to all
established and potential entrant brands. Let the actual or expected average sales
l1
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per brand when there are N brands optimally located in the market, all charging
price p, be given by
(5) q(p,N) = a(p)b(N),
where b(') is decreasing, and Nb(N) is non-decreasing and concave. This latter
assumption simply implies that total sales of the product does not fall as the num-
ber of brands increases, but the market-expanding effect of each additional brand
(even with all others optimally relocated) does not increase with the number of
brands on the market. It is easy to see that (3) satisfies these conditions. (Note
that q(p,N) must be multiplicatively separable, as in (5), if total sales, Nq(p,N)
are independent of N.) Total profits of the established brands are then given by
(6) V(p,N) = N(p,N) - A(p)Nb(N) - NF.
Let the values of p and N that maximize this expression be p and N, respectively.
In the circular model, a price-matching entrant's maximal sales were q(p,2N).
We can generalize this by supposing sales of such a brand to be q(p,yN), where y is
some constant greater than one, the exact value of which depends on the precise na-
ture of the economic space and of the distribution of consumers therein. The pro-
fits that would be earned by a typical price-matching entrant brand are then
(7) w(p,yN) A(p)b(yN) - F.
The existing firms optimally deter a price-matching entrant by choosing p and N so
as to maximize V(p,N) subject to the constraint (p,yN) < 0. Let the correspond-
ing values of p and N be pd and Nd , respectively. One might imagine two extreme
forms of solution to this problem. In the first, p < p and N = N. This is a
limit pricing strategy, and, given the demand asymmetry and the assumption of price-
matching, there must exist such a strategy that will deter entry with V(p,N) > 0.
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d mThe second extreme case will be termed a brand proliferation strategy: p = p,
N > N . Under this strategy, deterrence is achieved entirely by crowding economic
space. Section A of the Appendix shows that in fact the brand proliferation extreme
is always optimal in this illustrative model. The (qualitatively identical) com-
parative static properties of the unconstrained monopoly and deterrence equilibria
are outlined there as well.
Before discussing the implications of relaxing the special assumptions of this
example, let us expand the model slightly to include advertising. The simplest way
to do this in the present context is to consider only introductory advertising, and
to use F as a proxy for introductory spending per brand. Suppose that established
firms can choose F, and that level of spending will be matched by any potential
entrant. If all brands spend F on advertising, let (5) be replace by
(8) q(p,N,F) = A(p)b(N)d(F)
where d() is increasing and strictly concave. This equation makes the elasticity
of average brand sales with respect to average brand advertising independent of
price and the number of brands. Strict concavity implies diminishing returns to
advertising. Section B of the Appendix demonstrates that at a deterrence equili-
brium, F is such that reductions in advertising would increase the profits of the
established brands. The intuition here is that each brand's advertising expands
sales in direct proportion to its market area. Since entrants are more crowded af-
ter entry than are established firms before entry, i.e., since b(yN) is less than
b(N), entrants would receive less payoff from each dollar of spending than do
established brands. If entrants must match spending levels of established brands,
it is generally in the latters' interest to forego some short-run profits in order
to impose greater costs on potential entrants, and thus to increase the strength
of the entry deterrent via advertising.
l1
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The foregoing analysis suggests that under our basic assumptions, the privately
optimal entry deterrence strategy involves high prices, brand proliferation, and
some degree of over-spending on advertising. That analysis rests on restrictive
assumptions about behavior, of course, as do most formal analyses of small numbers
situations. I now want to argue that those behavioral assumptions are not necessary
for the conclusion. When potential entrants are sophisticated, the effectiveness
of any entry deterrence strategy must depend on the credibility of the post-entry
threat it is designed to convey. The threats implicit in the strategy described
above are at least as credible as any others available.
Suppose, for instance, that established firms attempt to deter entry by some
form of limit pricing. Suppose further that even though prices of all brands are
held below the short-run profit maximizing levels, entry nevertheless occurs. Low
prices of the brands directly competing with the entrant, having failed to deter its
entry, then have no further purpose (as far as the market area occupied by the new
entrant is concerned) except to inflict punishment on the interloper. But once the
entrant has launched, his fixed costs are forever sunk, and he will continue to
operate as long as price exceeds average variable cost: his brand is also more or
less immobile. Because they have demand advantages, established brands may be able
to force the entrant's price down to average variable cost without incurring sub-
stantial losses themselves. But this may well be an irrational strategy. Once the
entrant is in place, both its profits and those of its immediate rivals can gener-
ally be raised by increasing price. As only a small group of firms is involved,
and all have something to gain by raising price, one might expect price increases
to occur in the vicinity of an entrant. Thus, potential entrants are likely to
doubt that prices below the profit-maximizing level would be maintained after their
entry. But if they come to doubt this to any extent, limit pricing ceases to be an
effective deterrent even in principle, since low pre-entry prices cease to imply low
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post-entry prices. In sum, if we give potential entrants credit for the ability to
understand their post-entry position, the value of limit pricing as an entry deter-
rent declines.
To the extent that not all fixed advertising costs are associated with brand
introductions, a similar argument applies to the use of excess advertising as an
entry deterrent. Suppose we conceptually divide brands' advertising into introduc-
tory and maintenance spending. A brand's introductory spending is aimed at per-
suading buyers to try it the first time, while maintenance spending is aimed at
those who have tried it in the past. Higher maintenance spending by established
brands will raise the level of introductory spending an entrant must do in order
to be noticed. After entry, however, potential entrants might well expect profit-
increasing reductions in directly competitive maintenance spending, since, as be-
fore, only a small number of brands would be involved. Thus current levels of main-
tenance spending by established brands might not be persuasive indicators of the
level of post-launch promotion in which an entrant must engage to maintain its po-
sition. The deterrent effect of excess advertising is thus weakened, but it is not
eliminated, since spending levels of established firms need only be maintained dur-
ing the period of launch in order to impose additional fixed introduction costs on
an entrant brand.
There exist no similar arguments that weaken the case for brand proliferation's
private optimality. An expressed threat to surround an entrant immediately with
new brands controlled by established sellers would be a threat to engage in mutually
damaging warfare. On the arguments above, it might thus lack credibility. But if
the established firms can crowd economic space with brands before the threat of
entry appears, as we have been assuming, the entry-deterring threat is that the
brands will not be moved if entry occurs. Since repositioning brands is assumed to
involve substantial costs, such a threat is quite credible.2 2
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So far, it has been assumed that no potential entrant has a significant advan-
tage over established firms. If an outsider has such an advantage, because of a
major product or process innovation or superior marketing ability, for instance,
its entry is obviously harder to deter in any reasonable model. If the advantage is
great enough, deterrence may be impossible or unprofitable. In the appropriate dy-
namic context, however, it usually requires the investment of resources in some form
of research or development to secure such advantages. The task of entry deterrence
then involves persuading outsiders that such investments are not worth making. We
return to this point in Section IV.
It has also been implicitly assumed so far that entrants would generally at-
tempt to market brands perceived by consumers as different from those of established
firms. In the RTE cereal context, one should also consider the possibility of en-
try by an aggressive private labeler, which would attempt to produce recognizeable
imitations of some established brands. It would not need to go through the usual
introduction process, with its heavy advertising costs, and it would price its
brands below those they imitated. 2 3 Since there are increasing returns at small
levels of output for individual brands, such entry is most attractive when there are
a few large brands that can be imitated, because it is then more likely that produc-
tion efficiency will be attained. But if established firms have proliferated brands,
the shares of leading brands will be relatively low. The market share an imitator
of such a brand can hope to capture will be correspondingly reduced, and the at-
tractiveness of private labeling thus diminished. It is hard to see how any form of
limit pricing.would be a powerful deterrent, as the arguments made above apply with
a vengeance to a two-seller (the established brand and its imitator) situation.
Heavy advertising might be effective, but only to the extent that it persuaded con-
sumers that no private label product could be comparable to "the real thing" and
thus inhibited trial of any private label brand. A brand proliferation strategy
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thus appears to be a plausible and effective deterrent of private label entry as
well as of "branded" entry.
The basic picture that emerges from this section is consistent with the impli-
cation of Hay's [1976, p. 253] theoretical analysis that "firms in a differentiated
industry do not respond to the threat of new entry by lowering price, but rather
seek to proliferate products to fill up those parts of quality space where
there could be sufficient consumer demand to attract new entry." It is also consis-
tent with Scherer's [1977] description of conduct in the cement and Swedish tobacco
industries. In the latter case, removal of a government grant of monopoly status
led to dramatic increases in the number of cigarette brands.offered and in the le-
vel of advertising spending, as the firm sought to replace the entry barrier it had
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lost.
IV. APPLICATION TO RTE CEREALS
In the interests of tractability, perfect collusion and a static market were
assumed in the analysis above. In order to apply our general framework to the RTE
cereal industry, these assumptions must be appropriately relaxed. We now proceed
to do this, by considering in turn three important questions. First, there is no
evidence of explicit agreement among RTE cereal producers to coordinate advertising
or brand introduction conduct. Could a pattern of deterrence resembling that des-
cribed in Section III have arisen in the absence of such coordination? Second,
demand patterns for RTE cereals have not remained constant, established firms have
engaged in marketing and other research , and they have introduced numerous new
brands in the post-war period. Within our framework, how could the entry of new
firms have been deterred, even though established firms found it profitable to
launch new brands? Third, is the explanation advanced here for the lack of entry
during the 1950's and 1960's consistent with the appearance of new firms in the
natural cereals segment of the market in the early 1970's?
11
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In the 1950-1972 period, leading producers of RTE cereal did not use price with
any frequency as an instrument of rivalry. List price cuts and trade deals were
rare. Further, the leading firms did very little private label production and on
several occasions refused private label business. (In the 1970's, non-respondent
Ralston has deviated from this pattern.) Since private label brands compete through
price, avoidance of private label production served to protect a profitable price
structure. Without mutual avoidance of hard price competition, of course, the in-
dustry's high profits could not have been maintained. Suppression of non-price
rivalry was apparently less complete. The heavy use of in-the-package premia in the
early 1950's ended abruptly in the middle of that decade. The leading firms moni-
tored each others' advertising spending patterns closely, even exchanging detailed
information through Neilson until 1972. This monitoring presumably served to miti-
gate temptations to increase advertising outlays drastically, though advertising was
heavily used by any standards throughout the post-war period. 5 No evidence of any
attempt to control or restrain new product introductions has been discovered.
Overall, the observed pattern of conduct in the RTE cereal market seems consis-
tent with received doctrine about highly concentrated industries in which products
are differentiated:2 6 price competition is suppressed, and rivalry is channelled
into advertising and new product introduction. In game-theoretic language, while
pricing conduct may have been approximately cooperative, advertising was probably
noncooperative, and new brand introduction activity was almost surely noncooperative.
The implications of noncooperative brand introduction have received considera-
ble attention in models of spatial competition. Hotelling [1929] argued that there
would be a tendency for uncoordinated, perfectly mobile sellers to cluster in equi-
librium, rather than to disperse themselves to match the distribution of buyers,
Early analyses by Lerner and Singer [1937] and Smithies [1941] showed that Hotel-
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ling's argument depended critically on strong demand assumptions. A number of
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recent studies have made the more plausible polar assumption of complete immobility
and have considered sequential, uncoordinated entry of one brand firms in various
spatial models. 8 Studies by Peles [1974], Eaton and Lipsey [1975], Hay [1976],
Rothschild [1976], Salop [1976], and Prescott and Visscher [1977] have shown that
under a variety of assumptions, each firm's rational concern with subsequent entry
near its own single brand leads to dispersion, not clustering, in such cases.' The
general result that emerges is that brands are located far enough away from esta-
blished rivals so that demand is sufficient to permit excess profits, but not so far
away that profits will be eliminated by subsequent intermediate entry. In fact,
Salop [1976] has presented a formal model in which uncoordinated entry by single-
brand firms leads to precisely the same configuration of brand locations as would
perfectly coordinated entry deterrence via brand proliferation. Section C of the
Appendix shows that if the monopoly price is maintained, the circular model intro-
duced in Section III also has this implication.
In short, the spatial competition literature indicates that uncoordinated, non-
cooperative brand introduction rivalry can lead to a pattern of brand locations in
economic space much like that which would emerge from collusive action to deter the
entry of outsiders. The basic reason is that each firm selfishly positions its
brands so that new launches by insiders cannot erode its profits. If those profits
can then be maintained by avoidance of post-introduction rivalry, in particular by
avoidance of intense price competition, a pattern much like the collusive deterrence
equilibrium of Section III emerges. It thus seems plausible that such a pattern
emerged in the RTE cereal industry as an unforseen, but presumably not unwelcome,
consequence of a mode of behavior that arose more or less naturally from the indus-
try's structure.
Moreover, a pattern of rivalry focusing on advertising and new brands, and
avoiding price competition, seems likely to be self-reinforcing once established.
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The more effectively established brands are differentiated, the less incentive any
seller would have to engage in price competition. The less price competition among
established sellers, the greater the typical price-cost margin, and the greater the
incentive to advertise. To the extent that advertising outlays resemble fixed costs,
increased advertising intensity not only has the direct entry deterring effect noted
below equation (8), above, but it increases the asymmetry between the positions of
potential entrants and established sellers. 9 The latters' brands will be kept on
the market as long as variable costs are covered, while an entrant will only launch
if it can expect to cover total costs. The greater the difference between variable
and total cost, then, the less attractive aggressive price-cutting entry appears.
Finally, a prolonged period of heavy advertising during which multiple brands
are available might well affect individuals' perceptions of RTE cereals, making them
more sensitive to small differences among actual and potential competing brands.
In terms of the circular model of Section III, advertising might increase a as well
as A. In Section D of the Appendix, it is shown that if the relative increase in a
exceeds that in A, the attractiveness of brand proliferation is enhanced, since the
relative increase in profits at a deterrence equilibrium exceeds that at the uncon-
strained monopoly equilibrium. Conscious or unconscious recognition of these long-
run effects would tend to inhibit any efforts on the part of established sellers to
reduce advertising and brand introduction rivalry, especially in the face of excep-
tionally healthy profits.
Let us now turn to the second of the questions posed at the start of-this
Section: if the established firms found new introductions to be-profitable during
the 1950's and 1960's, why didn't outsiders? In order to deal with this question,
one must consider situations in which the density of demand at various locations in
economic space is changing over time, and in which there are costs associated with
learning about the demand distribution. In such an environment, opportunities for
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profitable new brand introductions will be created from time to time. Some of these
may be discovered by firms' research efforts. As long as demand is reasonably sta-
ble, the number of new opportunities visible to any set of firms in, say, any one
30year, will not be large relative to the total number of brands on the market. If
at some instant all the relevant economic space was crowded by the brands of esta-
blished sellers, most of it will then remain immune to entry for some time. A de-
terrence equilibrium of the sort described in Section III, once established, will
continue to protect against entry into already exploited regions of product space.
Further, under assumptions descriptive of the RTE cereal industry, the established
sellers will generally be the ones to take advantage of new opportunities. There
are two basic reasons why the research outlays necessary to locate such opportuni-
ties will be more attractive to established firms than to potential entrants.
The first was stated somewhat obliquely in a Lancastrian context by Archibald
and Rosenbluth [1975] and presented quite clearly in a spatial model by Eaton and
Lipsey [1976b]. 31 For concreteness, consider a one-dimensional model, and suppose
demand in a segment (of a line or circle) between two established brands is growing
in a fairly regular manner. Suppose this situation is known to some established
firms and to some potential entrants. In a highly concentrated market, with a few
sellers of multiple brands, it is natural to assume that the owners of the two
brands bordering the segment in question have reached a tacit understanding not to
react to new entry with intense price competition nor, presumably, to respond with
ruinous promotional spending. Further, since they face one another as direct com-
petitors at various points in the market, it is natural to assume that this under-
standing includes at least some of the other established sellers as well.
But, in the absence of an overt and unlikely conspiracy, no potential entrant
can possibly be party to this understanding. Any outsider must thus be less cer-
tain than at least some established firms about what reception would greet a new
l1
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brand he sought to establish in the segment. Any uncertainty of this sort means
that at any point in the segment's growth, the expected value of a new brand therein
is less to potential entrants, even assuming identical costs, than to established
sellers party to the understanding.32 This difference in value means that some
established firm will find it profitable to launch a new brand in the growing seg-
ment before any potential entrant sees it as large enough to support its brand. And
once the established firm has introduced its brand, both its existing and potential
rivals are pre-empted until considerable further growth occurs. In short, all other
things being equal, existing firms that have established a modus vivendi with their
major rivals possess an asset that makes profitable introduction of new brands in
segments that would not attract outside firms. Outsiders can thus be repeatedly pre-
empted by profitable insider introductions.3 3
A second reason why new brands tend to be launched by existing firms stems from
the apparent fact that minimum efficient firm size in the RTE cereal industry is a
multiple of minimum efficient brand size. Suppose that, somehow, a potential en-
trant comes to believe with certainty that any new brand it introduced would be giv-
en exactly the same reception as a new brand introduced by an established seller.
As before, suppose a single growing segment is observed by several established and
potential producers. If the established sellers have attained efficient firm size,
their costs for a new brand in the segment would be lower than those of any poten-
tial entrant, for which the new brand would be its first and only RTE cereal. Again,
the growing segment will become attractive enough to provoke introduction by a low-
cost (on the margin) established firm before it attracts any potential entrant, and
the latter will be pre-empted,
Further, scale effects at the firm level imply that existing firms can actually
afford to be somewhat less well-informed or aggressive than outsiders about market
opportunities. The rough numbers given in Section I suggest that any potential
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entrant would need to capture at last 3% of the market in order to produce effi-
ciently, while an existing firm might well be happy with a new brand that attained
a 1% share. The existing firms can thus overlook several opportunities for brands
that would be profitable for themselves without provoking entry. An entrant, on
the other hand, is faced with the task of either developing a single brand that will
exceed a 3% share (not a feat performed often in this market), or finding three or
four "normal-sized" opportunities and successfully taking advantage of all of them
before the existing firms pre-empt any.35 The potential entrant's research task is
clearly distinctly harder than those of established sellers.
Since the returns to product development activities are not predictable ex
ante, it is certainly likely that established firms will from time to time uncover
opportunitites that would have been attractive to an entrant ex post. This may well
have happened in the RTE cereal market; one can point to small sets of unusually
successful new products which might well have supported viable entry. This does
not mean that potential entrants were irrational. The arguments above indicate that
their expected payoff from research was distinctly below that of established firms,
even though among the possible outcomes from such research would have been a very
successful new'product. Given the barriers that faced them, a decision not to in-
vest substantial sums in attempts to find and exploit such opportunities was proba-
bly perfectly rational.
We can now turn to our third question: is the basic theory presented here
consistent with the entry into "natural cereals" that occurred in the early 1970's?
The last few paragraphs argued that as long as established firms did not overlook
substantial market opportunities visible to others, entry deterrence through brand
proliferation could be maintained even in the face of demand shifts. But what if
established sellers are slow to notice or to react to important developments? Eaton
and Lipsey [1976b, p, 26], dealing with an explicitly geographical model, put the
III
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basic answer well:
If either markets grow unexpectedly, or the change comes
to be expected only at a time at which new entry is al-
ready profitable, the market is "up for grabs" and a
scramble may ensue between new entrants and existing
firms.... This leads to the general prediction that the
more stable and easily predictable is market growth...
the more will the expanding market be served by new
branches of existing firms, while the more erratic and
unpredictable is market growth ... the greater the pos-
sibility of new firms entering to serve part of the
expanding market.
The evidence suggests that the shifts in consumer tastes that raised the demand for
natural cereals in the early 1970's were not well anticipated by most of the esta-
blished firms. As a result, a substantial new market segment was "up for grabs."
Existing proliferation is powerless to deter entry into substantial new segments,
as the brands are by definition in the wrong places. Without natural cereal brands
in place, the only possible threat of the established firms would have been to crowd
the segment whether or not entry occurred. This warfare threat, like similar ones
analyzed above, must generally lack credibility, even if it can be effectively com-
municated. It is hardly surprising, given the RTE cereal industry's record of pro-
fitability, that entry occurred under these circumstances.
The established sellers also introduced natural cereals, and the segment as a
whole has declined. Only one of the entrant firms (Pet) still has an RTE cereal
product in national distribution. The industry's history thus suggests that unless
the frequency of large unanticipated demand shifts rises dramatically, effective
entry deterrence if likely to be maintained indefinitely in the absence of correc-
tive outside intervention.
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V. WELFARE PROPERTIES OF ALTERNATIVE EQUILIBRIA
The analysis to this point indicates that the RTE cereal industry's basic de-
mand and cost conditions have interacted with a pattern of conduct emphasizing brand
introduction rivalry to produce a situation in which high profits are not eliminated
by rivalry among existing sellers and are not threatened by rivalry from potential
entrants. This Section applies the tools of welfare economics to see what can be
done about this in principle. It will be argued that even though brand introduction
and advertising are the most conspicuous aspects of conduct in this market, inter-
vention should focus as directly as possible on pricing and conditions of entry.
Let us temporarily assume that no matter what changes are made in the industry,
the pattern of introductory and maintenance advertising spending per brand will re-
main unaffected. We can then take brands' cost functions as fixed. The basic wel-
fare theoretic problem in situations of this sort was recognized and discussed long
ago by Chamberlin [1953, 1962]. On the one hand, the more brands that are offered
for sale, the better the market caters to the diversity of consumer tastes. On the
other hand, with increasing returns at the brand level, more brands generally imply
higher average costs. The problem of optimizing such an industry's organization
from a social point of view is complicated by the fact that price will generally
exceed marginal cost. Recent studies by Stern [1972], Willig [1973], Spence [1976a,
1976b], Salop [1976] and Dixit and Stiglitz [1977] have examined this problem under
a variety of assumptions, but no simple workable prescriptions have emerged.
We can illustrate the nature of these analyses and of the difficulties they
encounter by employing our illustrative cost function (1) and demand function (5),
thus restricting our attention to long-run comparisons in which all brands are opti-
mally located. The usual index of social welfare in these studies is the sum of
consumers' surplus and producers' excess profits. Under our assumptions, this can
37be written as
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(9) W(p,N) = f Nb(N)a(x)dx + V(p,N).
p
The partial derivatives of this welfare indicator are given by
(10a) W = Nb(N)(p-v)a'(p),
(10b) WN = [Nb'(N) + b(N)][A(p) + f a(x)dx] - F = M(N)G(p) - F,
P
where the last equality serves to define the functions M(N) and G(p). We assume
Nb(N) increasing and strictly concave, so that there are diminishing returns to
additional brands and M(N) is strictly decreasing. Similarly, as long as a(p) is
decreasing and p > v, G(p) is strictly decreasing. Since W has the sign of (v-p),
it is clear that marginal cost pricing is optimal for any N. With p = v, the wel-
fare optimal N, NW, is obtained by solving (10b). While the (p,N) pair (v,NW) is
socially optimal, it does not permit fixed costs to be covered and thus does not
represent a feasible outcome in most situations.
The welfare implications of a number of other (p,N) pairs can be considered.
dmWe have already defined the monopoly and deterrence points, (pm,Nm) and (pm,Nd).
Let ? be the number of brands just sufficient to drive profits to zero when p = p ,0
and let NW be the number of brands that maximizes W subject to the constraint that
p
p = p . If one takes the deterrence equilibrium as a first approximation to the
RTE cereal industry's current situation, intervention that focused on brand intro-
duction and ignored pricing would aim for the point (p ,NW). Finally, let (pW,Nw)
be the solution to the problem of maximizing W subject to the constraint that V be
non-negative. This is also a second-best equilibrium. Section E of the Appendix
extablishes that the zero-profit constraint is binding and that v < < p .
It is also shown there that the following inequalities relate the numbers of
brands in the various equilibria:
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(lla) Nm < Nd < N
(llb) Nm < N,
(llc) N< Nw,
(11ld) NW < Nw ,
(lie) N < N.
Further, these would seem to be the only inequality relations among the N's that
hold in general in this model.
If price is fixed at the monopoly level, (11b) implies that it is optimal to
increase N beyond the unconstrained profit-maximizing point. The intuition is that
each additional brand increases consumers' surplus, and until the last brand sub-
tracts as much from profits as it adds to surplus, further brands are optimally
w m
added. But it is apparently possible for N to fall short of Nd or to exceed NO.
Inequalities (11) do not support a charge that the deterrence equilibrium involves
too many brands in any well-defined sense, nor do they suggest that intervention
focusing on N is likely to increase welfare. (If the status quo point were uncon-
strained monopoly, it would be clear that the number of brands should be increased,
even if pricing could not be affected.)
A number of inequalities relating values of W at the various equilibria are
obvious from the definitions of those equilibria. In addition, Section E of the
Appendix establishes the following:
(12a) W(p ,Nw) > W(pm ,N ),
(12b) W(p ,Nw) > w(pm,Nd ).
The first of these simply points out that if profits are to be driven to zero, it
is best to do this with a price below the monopoly level. The second inequality
shows that the optimal zero profit point is strictly better than the deterrence
1l
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equilibrium. Since excess profits are zero by construction at (pw, N), it follows
'I 7T
a fortiori from (9) that consumers are better off than at (pm,Nd).
Suppose, based on the analysis of the preceding two Sections, we take the deter-
rence equilibrium as an approximate description of the state of the RTE cereal in-
dustry. Then (12b) suggests that if prices could be lowered by the correct amount,
and if entry eliminated excess profits, social welfare would increase. This sort
of implication follows from other formal models, as does the following difficulty.
w w
The pair (pw,N ) was found as the solution to a reasonably complicated constrained
optimization problem. Without the kind of complete information that is unlikely
ever to be available in practice, one can establish little beyond the fact that pw
is less than p .. While we know from (12b) that some increase in price competition,
coupled with free entry, would be optimal, we thus cannot say in any operational
way how much additional price competition is best. Nor does it seem possible to
devise simple policies that would be certain to drive the market to exactly this
optimal point. It does not seem possible to show that all zero-profit points lead
to a higher W than the deterrence point; this an only be shown with certainty for
points "close to" (pw,N ). In short, we cannot prove rigorously that all increases
in price competition coupled with free entry would serve to increase W; we have
only shown that some range of increases will do this.
Still, the foregoing analysis does have some useful implications. To the ex-
w w
tent that (pm,Nd) and (p ,ND correspond to the current and best feasible equilibria
in the RTE cereal market, the arguments above imply that the basic problem with sel-
ler conduct in that market is not that too many brands are introduced. It is rather
that too little price competition is present. Consumers would benefit directly from
lower prices, but as the industry is currently structured, these are not likely to
be forthcoming from established sellers, nor are they likely to be induced by new
entry. Further, intervention that seeks to enhance price competition and facilitate
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entry at least has the potential for raising welfare, as measured by W(p,N). Actions
that would focus directly on brand introductions or advertising spending do not have
this property; there is no rigorous way even to establish the desired directions of
change in these variables.
Two additional considerations not incorporated in the formal analysis above
lend additional support to this policy prescription. First, the welfare function
in (9) gave the same weight to a dollar of benefits enjoyed by consumers as to a
dollar of excess profits received by producers. In fact, many would argue that con-
sumer benefits are socially more valuable than excess profits received by producers.
If a greater weight is thus placed on the first term on the right of (9) than on the
second, the attractiveness of all points at which excess profits are zero is en-
hanced. In particular, the set of prices that (coupled with free entry) guarantee
an increase in welfare is expanded. In short, the less value society places on ex-
cess profits enjoyed by producers, the less the danger than any particular increase
in price competition will fail to be desirable.
Second, at the outset of this Section it was explicitly assumed that brand-
specific costs were unalterable. But, as we have repeatedly emphasized, a large
fraction of those costs over the life-cycle are advertising expenditures. Adver-
tising costs are conduct-determined to a considerable extent. Greater price compe-
tition would lower the spread between price and marginal production costs, thus
lessening the value of additional sales and, correspondingly, reducing the incentive
to advertise. Lower advertising by established brands should serve to reduce some-
what the required level of introductory spending. This may serve directly to facil-
itate new entry. Further, if one feels that the current intensive use of advertis-
ing in this industry is not ustified as a response to consumer demand for informa-
tion, or if one objects to the sizeable fraction of that advertising directed at
children, one should draw comfort from the fact that increased price competition
can be expected to reduce these outlays.
11
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VI. THE IMPACT OF PROPOSED RELIEF
The remedy proposed by complaint counsel in the RTE cereal litigation has four
substantive components, of which two are of primary importance: divestiture and
38
trademark licensing. The proposed divestiture would create five new firms, by
requiring the three largest respondents to divest themselves of certain established
plants and trademarks. The licensing remedy would require the three largest re-
spondents to license their existing trademarks (and to provide the corresponding
formulae) on a royalty-free basis to all non-respondent firms willing to meet quality
control standards. In addition, similar licenses would be required to be made avail-
able on new brands introduced by the "big three" five years after their introduction.
All such licenses would be limited in duration, so that trademarks would eventually
revert to the originating firm. The remainder of this final Section examines these
provisions in the light of the foregoing analysis and argues that the proposed re-
lief is quite likely to improve the RTE cereal industry's performance.
Divestiture will have the obvious immediate effect of producing a less concen-
trated structure, though the four largest firms will still account for over half
the industry's sales. One can expect this fall in concentration directly to in-
crease the extent of price competition in the industry. Moreover, one might expect
an indirect increase via private labeling. Respondents are clearly reluctant to
engage in private label production at present. Given the industry's high concentra-
tion, this reluctance likely derives in large part from fear that private labeling
would be viewed by major rivals as a form of aggressive price competition. Decon-
centration can be expected to weaken, at least to some extent, the tacit agreement
that supports this mutual reluctance to rock the boat. If private labeling acti-
vity is thus increased, the boat will be rocked, and pressure on prices generally
seems likely to appear. Finally, increased price competition from any source, by
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narrowing margins over production costs, will tend to reduce the incentive to engage
in rivalry via brand introduction and heavy advertising. The analysis above sug-
gests that reductions in these dimensions of rivalry among established sellers are
likely to have the desirable effect of facilitating entry of new competition.
Still, the proposed divestiture may not be itself constitute an adequate remedy.
While deconcentration can be expected to increase the intensity of rivalry, it might
not serve to focus rivalry on price to the necessary extent. The industry would
still be relatively concentrated; products would still be differentiated. If the
industry is to move toward a low-price, low-profit equilibrium, a change in the
"rules of the game" must be induced. Trademark licensing would operate in this
direction.
The proposed licensing requirement can be expected to have a variety of impacts
on the industry's conduct and performance. First, it places the three largest sel-
lers at a disadvantage relative to other existing and potential producers, so it can
be expected to reinforce the deconcentration effects of divestiture.
Second, this component of the remedy should have a strong direct effect on
price competition. Non-respondent firms will be able to produce products, which we
shall call "copies" for convenience, that can be truthfully promoted as identical
to respondents' established brands. There is no reason to suppose that non-respon-
dents will have access only to inferior production and marketing technology. They
will not need to engage in the usual level of introductory advertising in order to
establish such copies in economic space; this purpose should be accomplished in
large measure by the use of already established trademarks. If copies are produced
by firms with established reputations in prepared foods or marketed by large grocery
chains, the issue of differential firm reputation need not arise in buyers' minds.
The licensing component of the remedy should thus produce a situation in which at
least the largest established RTE cereal brands are offered for sale by more than
11
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one firm, and price competition seems virtually certain to erode the margins on
those brands. Lower prices for the largest brands seems likely to force reductions
in the prices of other (non-licensed) brands.
Third, trademark licensing will directly expand the options available to po-
tential entrants and thus serve to facilitate entry. Outsiders will be able to gain
a toehold in the industry by producing copies of leading brands. Since parity on
quality terms can be attained (and, if desired, advertised), this will be more at-
tractive than private labeling is now. Once a firm has attained efficient scale in
this-fashion, it will be favorably positioned to launch its own brands, should that
appear profitable. 4 0
Fourth, the provision that new brands of the top three firms must be licensed
royalty-free after five years should directly reduce the incentive to engage in
brand introduction rivalry. This reduction should help to prevent the re-emergence
of entry deterrence via brand proliferation. Because the period of exclusive owner-
ship of a trademark will be reduced from its present infinite length, the rewards
from new brand introduction will be reduced. Society has determined that infinity
41is too long for the life of a patent. Similarly, in the RTE cereal industry, in
which new brand introductions both add directly to consumers' search costs and are
the main component of a pattern of conduct that seems to have effectively deterred
new entry and protected excess profits, infinity is probably too long for the life
of a trademark. Some shorter trademark lifetime, such as the proposed five year
period, seems likely to improve performance.4
An important interaction effect between these two components of the proposed
relief should also be mentioned. In order for trademark licensing to have its de-
sired effect, there must be a set of firms well situated to take out licenses. The
proposed divestiture order would create just such a set of firms.
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To summarize, the proposed relief seems likely to facilitate entry, to increase
price competition, and to reduce directly and indirectly the incentive to prolifer-
ate new brands and to advertise heavily. As RTE cereals are produced by real firms,
not textbook simplifications, operating in a complex environment, one cannot prove
with mathematical certainty that the structural changes that would be produced by
the proposed remedy will induce these changes in conduct. But we have attempted to
show in this Section that the basic economics of the situation make it quite proba-
ble that conduct will change as indicated. Similarly, as was noted in Section V,
we cannot prove with mathematical certainty that these changes in conduct will raise
conventional measures of social welfare. But we argued there that the conduct
changes that the proposed relief seems quite likely to induce are precisely the sort
of changes that are most likely to improve the industry's performance. The proposed
relief thus seems to provide a solution to the problem in normative economics posed
by the RTE cereal industry's poor performance.
III
APPENDIX
Section A
The first-order conditions for unconstrained maximization of V(p,N), as given
by equation (6), are as follows:
(A.la) A'(p)Nb(N) = 0,
(A.lb) A(p)[b(N) + Nb'(N)] - F = 0
Note that we employ the usual assumption that N can be treated as continuous without
substantial error. Condition (A.la) clearly implies A'(pm) = 0. The corresponding
first-order conditions for maximization of V(p,N) subject to Tr(p,yN) < 0, assuming
the constraint strictly binding, are as follows:
(A.2a) A'(p)[Nb(N) - Xb(yN)] 
(A.2b) A(p)[b(N) + Nb'(N) - Xyb'(yN)] - F = 0
(A.2c) A(p)b(yN) - F = 0,
where X is a Lagrange multiplier, which can be shown to be positive, and (A.2c)
simply re-states the constraint.
Two types of solutions t conditions (A.2) might seem possible. In brand pro-
liferation solutions, (A.2a) is satisfied by A'(p) = 0, so that p = pm. Given p,
the value of N is obtained from (A.2c), and (A.2b) merely serves to determine X.
This solution implies Nd > N if the constraint is binding. In limit pricing solu-
tions, the term in brackets in (A.2a) is zero and A'(p) ~ 0. This gives one equa-
tion in N and X:
(A.3a) Nb(N) - Xb(yN) = 0
A second such equation is obtained by solving (A.2b) and (A.2c) for F/A(p) and set-
ting the resultant expressions equal:
b(N) + Nb'(N) - yb'(yN) - b(yN) = 0(A.3b)
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If these two equations could be solved for N and X, p would then be determined from
(A.2c). We now show that limit pricing solutions do not exist, since concavity of
Nb(N) implies that (A.3a) and (A.3b) have no solution.
If a solution to these equations existed, we could substitute for X in (A.3b)
from (A.3a) to obtain
(A.4) T = b(N)b(yN) + Nb'(N)b(yN) - b(yN) 2 - b(N)yNb'(yN) = 0
Concavity of Nb(N) can be readily shown to imply
(A.5a) Nb'(N) > [y/(y-l)][b(yN) - b(N)],
(A.5b) yNb'(yN) < [l/(y-l)][b(yN) - b(N)].
Equality holds in both of (A.5) if Nb(N) is constant. Substitution of (A.5) into
the expression for T and some algebra yield
(A.6) T(y-1) > [b(N) - b(yN)]2 > 0.
Thus T is positive for all N, and no solution to equations (A.3) exists.
Since A'(p) = 0 at both monopoly and deterrence equilibria, only shifts in the
function A(*) can affect p. In particular, as long as A(') is strictly concave and
m - d
a(^) is decreasing, increases in v raise pm pd. Equation (A.lb) can then be used
for further comparative statics in the monopoly case, while (A.2c) can be employed
for deterrence equilibria. If "-" is taken to mean "has the same sign as," straight-
forward differentiation then establishes that our assumptions imply the following:
(A.7a) dNd/dF dNm/dF < 0,
(A.7b) dqd/dF dqm/dF < O,
(A.7c) dNd/dv - dNm/dv < 0,
(A.7d) dNd/dD - dNm/dD> O,
where D is a multiplicative demand shift parameter;
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Section B
If equation (5) is replaced by equation (8), conditions (A.2) are still neces-
sary for an internal deterrence equilibrium, except that A'(p) in (A.2a) and A(p)
in (A.2b) and (A.2c) must be multiplied by d(F). An additional first-order condi-
tion must be added to the list:
(B.1) N[A(p)b(N)d'(F) - 1] - [A(p)b(yN)d'(F) - 1] = 0
Since X is positive when the constraint is strictly binding, the two terms in brac-
kets must be of the same sign. Since b(N) > b(yN), they cannot both be zero.
It is easy to show that (A.3b) holds at a deterrence equilibrium with demand
equation (8). Equation (A.3b) can be re-arranged as follows:
(B.2) [(X/N) - l]yb'(yN) = [b(N) - b(yN)]/N + [b'(N) - Yb'(yN)].
Inequalities (A.5) can be combined to establish
(B.3) [b'(N) - yb'(yN)] > [b(yN) - b(N)]/N.
Substitution of (B.3) into (B.2) then yields
(B.4) [(X/N) - llyb'(yN) > 0.
Since b'(yN) < 0, it follows that X < N.
Now suppose that both bracketed terms in (B.1) are positive. The result of
the preceding paragraph then implies
(B.5) N[A(p)b(N)d'(F) - A(p)b(yN)d'(F)] < 0.
But this is impossible, since both quantities in the bracketed expression are posi-
tive, and b(N) > b(yN). Thus both bracketed terms in (B.1) must be negative. But
the first term in (B.1) is just the partial derivative of the profits of the esta-
blished brands with respect to F. Its negativity and the strict concavity of d(.)
establish that those profits could be increased by reducing F (and thus obviously
making entry attractive), as was to be shown.
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Section C
In sequential entry models, independent brands are assumed to enter one at a
time and to take as given the locations of earlier entrants and the rational behav-
ior of subsequent entrants. Suppose that one brand is in position on the circle.
With price fixed at the monopoly level, the profits that the second brand to enter
expects to derive from the interval between it and the first brand are an increasing
function of the length of that interval - unless the interval is so long that sub-
sequent price-matching entrants will find it profitable to locate there. Thus the
second brand to enter will locate as far as possible away from the first brand, sub-
ject to the constraint that subsequent intermediate entry not be profitable. Assum-
ing that entry of the second brand is profitable and that two brands on opposite
sides of the circle would not render entry of a third brand unprofitable, that con-
straint must be binding.
Suppose brand 2 optimally locates 2d to the right (or left) of brand 1. A sub-
sequent price-matching entrant midway between them would sell to buyers as far
as (d/2) away on its right and on its left. Using the notation in the text and the
demand relation (2), its profits would be given by
(C.1) I' - A(pm) [d - (ad2/4)] - F,
where pm is the monopoly price, defined by A'(pm) - 0. By the argument in the pre-
ceeding paragraph, d must be.chosen so that ' - 0. But the same reasoning holds
for the third brand to enter, for the fourth brand, and so on. Neglecting integer
problems, entry will cease when all brands are separated by intervals of length 2d.
Since the circle is of unit circumference, the number of brands, N, will equal 1/2d.
Substituting into (C.1) and setting ' - 0, it follows that N is given by the solu-
tion to
(C.2) A(pm)(8N-a)/16N2 - F - 0.
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But from (4) in the text, the right-hand side of (C.2) is just (pm,2N). It then
follows from Section A above that the solution to (C.2) is exactly the N that would
be chosen by a monopoly seeking optimally to deter entry.
Section D
In the circular model of Section III, let A* be the maximized value of A(p).
Total profits of the established brands are given by V(p,N) = N(p,N), where (p,N)
is given by (4) with A = A*. The unconstrained maximum of V is easily shown to be
(D.1) Vm = A*[l - /Z] A*f(Z), where
(D.2) Z E F/A*,
and the second equality in (D.1) defines f(Z). At a deterrence equilibrium in this
model, V(p,N) is maximized subject to the constraint (p,2N) < 0. This constraint
is binding for Z < .640, and at such an equilibrium the total profits of the esta-
blished brands are given by
(D.3) Vd =A* {1 - [ + 1 + A*g(Z),
+ Vi--Z
where the second equality defines g(Z).
Suppose now that advertising changes A* by a small amount AA* and shifts a such
that Z changes by a small amount AZ. Let the resultant changes in V and Vd be AVm
and AVd , respectively, and suppose AVm = eVm . Differentiation and substitution
then establish
(D.4) AVd = Vd + [A*/f(Z)][g'(Z)f(Z) - g(Z)f'(Z)]AZ.
The difference in brackets is a messy function of Z; numerical evaluation shows it
to be positive for 0 Z < .640. If A and a increase because of advertising, but
the percentage increase in a is larger, AZ will be positive. It then follows from
(D.4) that the percentage increase in Vd will exceed that in Vm, as was asserted in
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the text. It also follows that while increases in F lower both Vd and V, the lat-
ter falls more in percentage terms. The intuitive reason is that (F/A*) can be
thought of as a measure of the importance of the nonconvexity upon which deterrence
rests.
Section E
Let us first give the conditions that determine N under the various assumptions
indicated in the text. From (10),
(E.1) M(Nw) - F/G(v).
From (A.lb) and (A.2c),
(E.2) M(N - F/A(pm), and
(E.3) b(yNd) - /A(pm).
From (10b), G(p) > A(p) at any price at which purchases are made. Assuming the de-
terrence constraint is binding, b(yNm) > M(Nm), and we shall assume that this in-
equality holds for all N. From the relevant definitions,
(E.4) b(N - F/A(pM)
Note that b(N) > b(yN) for all N. From (10b),
(E.5) M(N ) - F/G(p ).
Finally suppose W(p,N) is maximized subject to the constraint that V(p,N) be
non-negative. Since (10a) implies W < 0 for p > v, and since the constraint cannot
p
be satisfied at p - v, the constraint must be binding. The first-order conditions
can be written as follows:
(E.6a) A(p)b(N) - F - 0,
(E.6b) (p-v)a'(p) + A'(p) - 0,
(E.6c) M(N) F[1 + X]/[G(p) + XA(p)],
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where X is a positive Lagrange multiplier. Condition (E.6a) simply restates the
constraint. Condition (E.6b) can easily be seen to imply that the optimal con-
w w m
strained price, p, satisfies v < p < p . Eliminating X between (E.6b) and (E.6c),
we obtain
(E.7) M(Nw) = F/{[G'(pw)I(pw)/a(pw)] + G(pw)}
= F/{[A'(p )I(pw)/a(pw)] + A(p)} = F/H(p)
where the last equality defines H(p), and I(p) is the integral appearing in (10b).
We have immediately that for p > v, H(p) < G(p), since G(p) is decreasing in the
relevant range. Since G is decreasing, it also follows that H(pw) < G(v).
Of inequalities (11) in the text, only (11e) does not follow immediately from
the results of the preceding two paragraphs. To prove that Nw < Nm it sufficies7T 0
W W m m
to observe that both (p ,N=) and (p ,No) satisfy (E.6a). But by definition,
A(p ) > A(p ), since p pw, and the result follows from b'(N) < 0.
w w m w
To establish (12a), note that both (pw,NW) and (p NO) satisfy the zero profit
constraint. The first point yields a maximum of W subject to that constraint. But
the second point satisfies an additional restriction that the first does not: p > p .
The proof of (12b) is as follows. Let V - V(pm,Nd) > 0. Suppose W is maxi-
mized subject to the constraints p > p and V(p,N) > V. The solution will be some
point (pm,N') such that W(p ,N') W(pm,Nd). Now consider a second optimization
problem, formed from this first one by dropping the first constraint entirely and
relaxing the second by replacing V with zero. As noted above, Wp(pm,N) < 0. Thus
the dropped constraint was strictly binding, so its removal must raise the optimal
value of the objective function. Replacing V with zero expands the feasible set
and cannot lower optimal W. But the second problem is precisely the one that led
WW W
to the point (p ,N ), so that W(P ,N ) > W(p ,N') > W(pm,N ), and the proof is
complete.
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FOOTNOTES
1. F.T.C. v. Kellogg, et al, Docket No. 8883. Nabisco and Ralston-Purina, the fifth
and sixth largest firms in the market, were mentioned in the complaint but not
listed as respondents.
2. F.T.C. Docket No. 8883, transcript pages 21671-23935.
3. Since this industry advertises heavily, the accounting treatment of advertising
outlays is the most obvious source of such biases.
4. More precisely, following Caves and Porter [1977], there exists some barrier to
entry into the group of sellers producing differentiated brands of RTE cereal
and marketing them nationally. Small regional producers that advertise little
have apparently entered and exited from this industry over the years, but member-
ship in the group of leading sellers was restricted to the six firms named above
until the 1970's.
5. The list of attributes considered of course follows Bain [1956]. One non-stan-
dard factor, specific to the RTE cereal industry and a few others, should be
mentioned at this point. All respondents have for some time offered free advice
to retailers about the brands of RTE cereal they should stock and about how these
brands should be displayed along the "cereal aisle." Kellogg's is apparently the
clearly most important such "shelf space plan." While one can imagine that re-
spondente' advice would be slanted against stocking new entrants' products (and,
more importantly, that potential new entrants might expect it to be so slanted),
and there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that advice has in fact not always
been purely scientific, no very precise picture of the effects of these plans is
currently available. In any case, while a practice on the part of established
firms of giving free, useful, but slanted advice to retailers might well make
potential entrants somewhat more reluctant to enter, it is hard to imagine such
plans being powerful deterrence devices.
1 _I I__
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6. The entry of the 1970's occurred, as was noted above, in the natural segment of
the market. There is some indication that the production process for natural
cereals is simpler than for other types, so that minimum efficient firm size in
this segment may be below the range indicated. Of course, production economies
interact with those in distribution and promotion in determining minimum effici-
ent scale. In any case, no estimate of the magnitude of the net difference (if
any) between segments is available.
7. One can perhaps go back even a few more years. In retrospect at least, some of
Sraffa's [1926, pp. 182-97] language, which Hotelling 1929] cites approvingly,
is very suggestive of a spatial model.
8. The sourest and sweetest ciders on the market have only one neighbor each. "End
effects" of this sort seem unlikely to be of much importance in markets with many
brands, and they will generally be ignored in what follows.
9. See also Kaldor [1934], where the spatial analogy and its implication of over-
lapping oligopolies are noted.
10. In his text, Vickrey [1963, pp. 323-34] provides a very insightful discussion of
the then extant literature on spatial competition.
11. The only explicit criticism of the spatial competition approach to the analysis
of differentiation in the recent literature seems to be that of Demsetz [1971].
He faults it for being partial equilibrium in nature and (in the context of dif-
ferentiation by geographic location) for failing to consider land rents adequate-
ly. On these points, see Telser [1971] and Eaton and Lipsey [1976c, note 18].
12. In his important work on product selection, Spence's [1976b] demand assumptions
are of the symmetric type, though he has argued elsewhere [1976a] that a Lancastrian
framework is appropriate for applied work involving differentiated products.
See also the spatial language employed in his [1976b, p. 234] discussion of entry
deterrence.
11
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13. One formal difference is that each buyer in a spatial model is assumed to pur-
chase only one brand, while in a Lancastrian model buyers may rationally elect
to consume as many brands as there are relevant characteristics. As long as
localization is present, however, this makes no real difference to the aggregate
demand conditions facing any individual brand.
14. If a new entrant were to charge a price so low that demand for one of the two
established brands between which it entered were driven to zero, further price
cuts would of course affect an additional brand. (Such price cuts are called
"ZAPS" by Salop [1976].) Drastic actions of this type are considered further be-
low, where it is argued that an entrant is unlikely to perform them.
15. For general discussions of such costs within the spatial competition framework,
see Vickrey [1963, pp. 323-34], Hay 1976, p. 252], and Prescott and Visscher
[1977].
16. Samuelson [1967] does not handle seller mobility in a consistent fashion, as
Grace [1970] points out. In his reply to Grace, Samuelson [1970] seems to accept
the assumption of fixed locations.
17. The upper bound on a avoids technical complications that arise when some consum-
ers don't buy any of the brands; see Lerner and Singer [1937] and Salop [1976].
18. With one additional assumption, it is easy to show that this functional form and
the generalization employed below satisfy the conditions of Willig's [1976] "pure-
repackaging" case. Let there be N brands on the market, let the distance around
the circle to the ith brand be xi, and let qi be the amount of that brand con-
sumed. Let p and z be vectors of prices and quantities consumed of other goods,
and let I be income. Then if the demand function in the text can be expanded as
q(p)f(p,I)(l-ax), where f is any function, it follows from Willig's [1976] Propo-
sitions 3 and 4 that demand for this good is derivable from maximization of a
N
utility function of the form U qi/h(xi), z], where h is an increasing function.
i=l
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(This suggests a natural approach to generalizing the demand structure in the
text to cover situations in which brands' prices differ.) The transportation
cost model satisfies the conditions of Willig's [1976] "cross-repackaging" case.
19. Location exactly next to an established brand would produce sales of q(p,N)/2,
whereas location midway between two established brands would yield q(p,2N).
Equation (3) implies that Nq(p,N) is non-decreasing in N, which suffices to show
that q(p,2N) > q(p,N)/2. Other locations can be shown to offer no improvement
by constructing demand integrals that generalize (2) and choosing location to
maximize sales. The intuition is that location at the center of an open interval
has the maximum market expansion effect, since buyers at nearby locations were
the worst served in the pre-entry situation.
20. Deterrence equilibria of this sort are explicitly described in one-dimensional
models under alternative behavioral assumptions by Eaton 1976] and Salop [1976].
21. Arguments resembling that of this paragraph have been made for undifferentiated
markets by Scherer [1970, pp. 228-9], in the context of spatial models by Hay
[1976] and Eaton and Lipsey [1976b], and with reference to a Lancastrian model
by Archibald and Rosenbluth [1975].
22. Established brands that suffered losses because of entry might be withdrawn alto-
gether, of course. But the favored demand positions of established brands en-
sures that any entrant that imposed losses on an established brand would incur
greater losses itself. Should an entrant, for some reason, attempt this sort of
warfare, it seems unlikely that established firms would surrender unless they
happened to be exceedingly short of liquid funds.
23. Since the established brands are trademarked and their formulae and production
processes are not public knowledge, and since consumers know this, it is presum-
ably impossible for any entrant to occupy exactly the same position as an esta-
blished brand in the economic space of consumer perceptions. In fact, Willig
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[1973, p. 162] suggests that some finite "protected area" around established
trademarked brands is immune to entry. (rademarks thus rule out the sort of
de-stabilizing moves referred to as "ZOOMS" by Salop [1976]. See also Eaton
[1976] and Eaton and Lipsey [1976c].)
24. For an early discussion of the use of multiple products to deter entry and to
protect established lines (with no analysis of the mechanism that might permit
this), see Lanzillotti [1954].'
25. It is worth noting, however, that one reason why rates of return did not fall in
the late 1960's when demand growth ceased is that established sellers made sub-
stantial cuts in advertising outlays.
26. See, for instance, Scherer [1970, p. 336].
27. A review of and substantial contribution to this literature is provided by Eaton
and Lipsey [1975].
28. As far as I know, only Teitz [1968] has attempted to model formally the noncoop-
erative brand location decisions of firms selling multiple brands, and such re-
sults as he obtains depend on'very strong assumptions. Vickrey [1963, pp. 323-
34) privides an informal discussion of the results of sequential uncoordinated
entry.
29. The point that follows is due to Eaton and Lipsey [1976b, p. 241.
30. From 1950 through 1972, the number of introductions of brands into distribution
beyond test market averaged about 7% of the number of brands beyond test distri-
bution at the start of the year.
31. See also Vickrey [1963, pp. 323-334] for remarks that bear on this mechanism.
32. It is not being argued that potential entrants believe with certainty that their
entry would provoke a predatory response. As long as an entrant's expectations
about rival reactions are less optimistic to any degree than those of established
firms, the latter will enter first and pre-empt the' relevant segment. And as
long as potential entrants agree with Yamey [1972] that predatory reaction to new
entry is at least plausible, this difference will exist. This same sort of be-
havioral disadvantage may face established sellers considering segments bordered
by rivals with whom they have not previously established a mutually agreeable
pattern of conduct. The smallest established sellers might from time to time be
pre-empted for this reason. (See footnote 4, above.)
33. Eaton and Lipsey [1976b] show formally in a particular one-dimensional model that
fear of rivalrous reaction would lead a potential entrant considering a brand
that would be on the edge of the market to choose an inefficient location, thus
further reducing the value of the brand to him.
34. Of the 80-odd brands introduced into distribution beyond test market in the 1950-
1972 period by the six leading sellers, only two ever attained a market share
above 3 for any year in this period.
35. Multiple brand entry may be indicated by strategic as well as cost considerations.
It is at least plausible that a single brand would be more likely to provoke pre-
datory reactions than would multiple brands, since a firm that introduces several
brands signals more convincingly its intention to remain in the industry. Poten-
tial entrants may thus feel a need to enter developed portions of the market with
a full line of cereals in order to become "members of the club" without a period
of warfare.
36. That is, if N brands are optimally located, costs of mobility imply that adding
another brand will not produce a situation with (N+l) brands optimally located.
Given shifts in tastes over time, however, one might expect different patterns
of brand introduction rivalry to lead in the long run to situations with differ-
ent numbers of brands, all at least approximately optimally located.
36. On the welfare function in this particular form, see Willig [1973, 1976] and
Spence 1975, 1976b].
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38. The other two components are a ban on acquisitions, which serves to make divesti-
ture effective, and a prohibition of the shelf space plans discussed in footnote
5, above. The positive case for eliminating such plans is that they may give the
largest established firms advantages over potential entrants and, possibly, their
smaller existing rivals. Though, as footnote 5 indicated, the actual and poten-
tial effects of these plans are not well understood, it is hard to see what so-
cial harm could derive from prohibiting RTE cereal manufacturers from giving free
advice. If such advice is worth having, grocers will presumably purchase it from
sources less likely to be biased against new entry into the industry. If the
advice is worth less than the cost of producing it, it will not be purchased, and
resources will be saved.
39. These firms are Kellogg, General Mills, and General Foods.
40. This paragraph and the preceding one have implicitly assumed that licensing will
be attractive. It might be possible for existing producers to deter potential
licensees in classic limit pricing fashion by substantially reducing prices on
the leading brands. Even if this is possible and actually comes to pass, the
remedy will have nonetheless served to reduce prices and excess profits -- by
means of potential rather than actual price competition. It will thus have
attained its major performance objectives.
41. An early, and somewhat extreme, statement of the relation between patents and
trademarks was given by Chamberlin [1962, pp. 57-64].
42. This period was derived by reference to the pattern of lifetimes of apparently
profitable brands, some but not all of which are on the market for more than
five years.
